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ABTRACT
Fraud in public sector is still widespread in Indonesia. Good corporate 
governance and internal control can prevent fraud. This paper 
examine corporate governance in Indonesia. Corporate governance 
and prevention of fraud can affect the economy of a country. Proper law 
enforcement is needed to reduce fraud and corruption. Ethical culture 
and governmental structure is a factors to be considered to create a 
better institutional environment. Governmental internal control is 
need to be improved in order to prevent fraud. Internal Auditor can be 
more effective in preventing fraud than external auditor. The ACFE’s 
2008 survey provides empirical evidence to this effect as the survey 
foundthat over 19% of the respondents’ fraud cases were initially 
detected by internal audits versusabout 9% that were discovered by 
external audits.
1. INTRODUCTION
There is a chance of fraud in every 
organization including public sector 
organization. Corruption may occur 
whenever an employee is authorized to 
spend an organization’s money(Wells, 
2003). The establishment and operation of a 
“perfect” governance structureis possible. 
Successful companies have common 
characteristics. One ofthose characteristics 
is an effective governance structure. 
Companies that failor have serious financial 
and operating issues will generally 
suffer from ineffectivegovernance as one 
of the reasons for failure. (Kaufmann, 
Kraay&Mastruzzi, 2010). 
This study examine the weakness of 
internal control and fraud in the public 
sector inculding government, Central 
Bank, and State owned companies. The 
diversity in Indonesia also play significant 
role in building corporate governance. 
People from Jakarta and People from 
Papua might have different ethical 
behaviour. Audit Board of Indonesia, 
Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK) have to 
find the weaknesses in the internal control 
systems and compliance to the regulation. 
In 2016 BPK found 9.729 findings that 
contains 14.997 issues, consisting 7.284 
(49%) issues related toweaknesses in 
internal control, and 7.549 (50%) issues 
related to non-compliance to the regulation 
costing Rp25,14 trillion, and 164 (1%) 
issues of efficiency costing Rp2,25 trillion. 
Fraud in Financial Statement
According to Australian Securities & 
Investment Comission financial statement 
fraud involves deliberately misleading 
or omitting amounts or disclosures 
in financial statements in an attempt 
to deceive financial statement users, 
particularly investors or creditors.
This might involve:
- The falsification, alteration or manipu-
lation of material financial records;
- Material, intentional omissions or mis-
representations of events, transactions, 
accounts, or other significant informa-
tion from which financial statements 
are prepared.
Asia Pacific Fraud Journal
E-ISSN: 2502-695X, ISSN: 2502-8731
Volume 4, Nomor 1 (January-June) 2019
http://apfjournal.or.id/index.php/apf 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE)
Indonesia Chapter
© 2019
Asia Pacific Fraud Journal, 4(1) January-June 2019: 96-100 | 97
- Deliberate misapplication of account-
ing principles, policies, and procedures 
used to measure, recognise, report, and 
disclose economic events and business 
transaction.
- Intentional omissions of disclosures or 
presentation of inadequate disclosures 
regarding accounting principles and 
policies and related financial amounts.
Conditions When Fraud Occurs
Statement on Auditing Standards SAS 
No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a 
FinancialStatement Audit, states that three 
conditions are generally present when 
fraud occurs. First, thereis an incentive 
or a pressure to commit fraud. Second, 
circumstances provide an opportunity 
forfraud to be perpetrated e.g., weak 
controls or ability of management to 
override controls. Finally,there is an 
attitude or rationalization forcommitting 
fraud.These conditions collectively 
areknown as the fraud triangle. 
Bell and Carcello 2000 find support 
for the existence of fraud triangle 
conditions for asample of financial fraud 
companies. They estimate a logistic 
regression modelpredicting theincidence 
of fraud and find several risk factors 
associated with fraud: rapid growth, 
weak controlenvironment, management 
overly preoccupied withmeeting analysts’ 
forecasts, management thatlied to 
auditors or was overly evasive, ownership 
status, and an interaction between the 
controlenvironment and management 
attitude toward financial reporting.
Need of External Financing
The incentive to misstate earnings can 
arise due to pressure to meet analysts’ 
forecasts,compensation and incentive 
structures, the need for external financing, 
or poor performance.Dechow et al. 1996, 
using a sample of 92 firms subject to 
accounting enforcement releasesduring the 
period 1982–1992, find that an important 
motivation to manipulate earnings is 
thedesire to attract external financing at 
low cost.
Symptoms of Fraud
Symptoms of fraud are often referred 
to as “red flags.” SAS No. 99 identifies 
“red flags” asrisk factors and further 
categorizes those risk factors in the three 
areas included in the fraud triangle: 
pressures/incentive, opportunity, and 
attitudes/rationalizations. Albrecht and 
Albrecht2003 categorize the symptoms 
of fraud into six types: 1 accounting 
anomalies; 2 internalcontrol weaknesses; 
3 analytical anomalies; 4 extravagant 
lifestyles; 5 unusual behaviors; and6 
tips and complaints. One of the major 
challenges in identifying fraud is that while 
symptomsof fraud “red flags” are observed 
frequently, the presence of such issues is 
not necessarilyindicative of fraud Albrecht 
and Romney 1986 and investigation of such 
anomalies usuallyresults in a conclusion 
that fraud was not the underlying cause. 
It is also difficult to combine andweight 
fraud risk factors to assess overall fraud 
risk and formulate an audit plan Patterson 
andNoel 2003. Further, due to attempts 
by perpetrators to conceal their acts, “red 
flags” may berelatively few in frequency 
and minor in amount, at least in the early 
stages of fraudulent financialreporting.
Communication with Audit Committee
Cohen et al. 2007 review literature related 
to audit committees and financial reporting 
integrityand issues relating to auditor 
communication with the audit committee. 
While several academicstudies examine 
the association between audit committee 
independence and audit committee 
effectivenessthese studies were discussed 
earlier in the section on the characteristics 
of fraud firms,in the subsection on 
opportunities to commit fraud, there is 
a dearth of evidence on communication 
between the external auditors and the audit 
committee.
Board Structure
An important function of the board of 
director is to minimize costs that arise 
from the separation of ownership and 
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decision control of the modern-day 
corporation (Fama and Jensen 1983)Fama’s 
(1980) and Fama and Jensen’s (1983) 
theory regarding board composition, 
prior empirical research and the various 
recommendations for board of director 
reform suggest that having a higher 
percentage of outside directors increases 
the board’ s effectiveness as a monitor of 
management. 
Corporate Governance in Indonesia
Governance is defined as how “the 
traditions and institutions by which 
authorityin a country is exercised. 
This includes the process by which 
governmentsare selected, monitored and 
replaced; the capacity of the government to 
effectivelyformulate and implement sound 
policies; and the respect of citizens andthe 
state for institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions amongthem” 
(World Bank, 2007)
Corporate governance plays an 
important role in protecting investors, in 
theprudent operation of companies and 
financial institutions, and in the stabilityof 
the financial sector. Principles of good 
governance have been a majorcomponent 
of international financial standards, and 
many regulators vieweffective corporate 
governance as “the first line of defense” in 
their supervisory.(Verhezen, 2016)
Good public governance practices 
might teach the corporate elite toimplement 
good corporate governance, such as 
manager-compensationpolicies, proper 
division of power within the organization, 
rules of successionto top positions, and 
institutionalized competition in core areas 
ofgovernance (for instance, voting rights, 
competitive processes, and votingRules 
(Benz&Frey 2007),
Within the Indonesian public sector, 
citizens as principals have little controlover 
the governing elites and the bureaucrats as 
their agents. Rarely dopublic office holders 
have the best interests of the public in mind. 
Enteringthe bureaucracy and politics is 
seen as employment for self-interest where 
thewielding of power takes precedence 
over serving the public.
Disclosure in Corporate Governance
Disclosure is one essential pillar of a 
good corporate governance system. Many 
scholars acknowledge that disclosure is 
the key factor in corporate governance and 
at the heart of corporate accountability and 
as such, its most important element. Porter 
cited in D ABavly, (Wiley & Sons, 2004).
Disclosure is recognised as a key 
corporate governance protection for 
shareholders.It is believed that disclosure 
is ‘an effective tool for improving investor 
protection’ and a powerful apparatus for 
monitoring the risks to which they are 
exposed (Walsh, 2005).
Simple, clear, and informative 
disclosure may prevent financial fraud. 
There are a number of examples where 
poor disclosure, including complicated and 
technical accounting creates a distorted 
view of the company and constitutes 
dishonesty. This includes the manipulation 
of information of off-balance sheets and 
other unintended use of accounting rules. 
(Macey, 2004).
BPK found 9,729 findingsthat contains 
14.997 problems, consisting 7.284 (49%) 
weakness in internal control and 7.549 
(50%) non-compliance to the regulation 
problemscosting Rp25.14 trillion, and 
164 (1%) inefficiency and ineffectiveness 
problems costing Rp2.25 trillion. 
The problems of weakness in internal 
control from the investigation report (IHPS 
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2017) are:
1. The consolidation of state government 
performance report in 2016 still using 
manual method.
2. Weakness in tax administration.
3. Control over subsidy program still not 
clear. 
4. The use of government state budget 
(APBN) for public service obligationfor 
transportation by train still not clear.
5. Control over special allocation budget 
(DAK) for supporting facilities is not 
satisfying.
6. The settlement of deficit in social wel-
fare fund asset was still not clear.
For the above problems the government 
responses are:
1. Finance ministry and directorate gen-
eral of taxation (DJP) is information 
technlogy blueprint in order to integrate 
the information systems.
2. Finance ministry and directorate gen-
eral of taxation will set the risk man-
agement strategy to control the subsidy.
Table 1
Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK) Findings
Government/Investigation Type Total Investigation 
Report
Total Find-
ings
Total Recommen-
dation
State Governement 133 1411 3,588
Financial Investigation 102 1322 3,330
Performance Investigation 1 11 41
Special Purpose Investigation 10 78 217
Provincial Government 537 7,950 21,351
Financial Investigation 537 7,950 21,351
State Owned Companies and Other 
Institution
37 368 998
Financial Investigation 6 45 133
Performance Investigation 8 104 262
Special Purpose Investigation 23 219 603
Total 687 9,729 25,937
Financial Investigation 645 9,317 24,814
Performance Investigation 9 115 303
Special Purpose Investigation 33 297 820
3. Finance ministry and directorate gen-
eral of taxation will ask the direcorate 
general of railways to make a record of 
the use of the budget.
4. Finance ministry will set the mecha-
nismm of control over allocation with 
the provincial government need.
5. Finance ministry will make a statement 
relating deficit in social welfare fund.
The weaknesses in internal control systems 
were generally caused by:
1. The officials supervision and control 
in the activies was not optimal and 
the coordination with the unit was not 
optimal.
2. The executors of the activities hasn’t 
record, input data, and reconciliate 
carefully.Planning of the activities and 
budget was not optimal.
3. The officials and executors in charge 
was not following/ not comprehending 
the rules and procedures in carrying 
out activities and using the budget.
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2. CONCLUSION
The weakness in corporate governance in 
indonesia is mainly from weak internal 
control systems and non-compliance to the 
regulation. Effective corporate governance 
is needed in the public sector to prevent 
fraud. The communication between the 
audit board of Indonesia (BPK) and audit 
comittee of the government institution need 
to be optimized. Citizen have little control 
over government elite in Indonesia, more 
disclosure is needed in the government 
so the citizen can have control over the 
activities of the government. Government’s 
information systems need to be integrated 
and better tax administration and systems 
is needed. If the corporate governance is 
implemented effectively the public sector 
frauds will be reduced and minimized.
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